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Abstract 
We consider the assessment of disclosure risk in the release of microdata from social surveys as public-
use files. We consider both identification risk and the notion of differential privacy introduced in the 
computer science literature. We show that sampling, as a disclosure limitation technique, does not 
guarantee differential privacy. However, threats to differential privacy, i.e. 'leakage', may have small 
probability and sampling can provide protection under a broader definition of privacy. Moreover, the 
occurrence of conditions when such a threat can occur may be unknown to the adversary and require 
statistical inference. Disclosure limitation techniques that perturb variables in the microdata according to 
misclassification probabilities guarantee differential privacy provided that there are no zero elements in 
the misclassification mechanism. Combining sampling and perturbation, especially for rare combinations 
of identifying variables, will reduce the 'leakage'.   1 
Privacy Protection from Sampling and Perturbation in Survey 
Microdata 
 
Natalie Shlomo and Chris Skinner 
Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute, University of Southampton, 
Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ United Kingdom 
Email: N.Shlomo@soton.ac.uk, C.J.Skinner@soton.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: Statistical agencies release microdata arising from social surveys as public-
use files after applying statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) techniques. Disclosure 
risk is assessed in terms of identification risk where small counts on cross-classified 
indirect identifying key variables, i.e. a key, can be used to make an identification and 
confidential information may be learnt. In the computer scientist literature, there is no 
distinction between key variables and sensitive variables, and it is assumed that an 
adversary,  who  wishes  to  learn  about  a  specific  target  individual,  would  have 
complete information about all other units in the population database. Sampling as an 
SDL technique is examined according to the definition of differential privacy. We 
show that in special cases when a sample unique in the key is also a population unique, 
differential  privacy  is  not  guaranteed  and  a  small  'leakage'  may  occur.  Indeed, 
statistical agencies do not have knowledge of the population database since it depends 
on  non-sampled  units  and  statistical  inference  is  used  to  estimate  the  population 
counts.  Therefore,  the  disclosure  scenario  of  differential  privacy  may  be  deemed 
unrealistic.  SDL  techniques  that  perturb  variables  in  the  microdata  according  to 
misclassification probabilities guarantee differential privacy provided that there are no 
zero  elements  in  the  misclassification  mechanism.  Combining  sampling  and 
perturbation, especially for rare combinations of the key, will reduce the 'leakage' and 
guarantee differential privacy.   
Keywords:  Identification  Disclosure,  Attribute  Disclosure,  Differential  Privacy, 
Misclassification 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Statistical  agencies  release  microdata  from  social  surveys,  such  as  a  labour  force 
survey  or  a  survey  of  incomes,  where  the  units  of  investigation  (households  or 
individuals)  have  small  inclusion  probabilities.  Provisions  for  releasing  these 
microdata  range  from  public-use  files  where  the  microdata  is  heavily  protected 
against disclosure risk, microdata-under-contract and special licensed data typically 
delivered through data archives. In addition, many statistical agencies have facilities 
for visiting researchers to access unprotected microdata in a safe setting.  Microdata 
from business surveys are generally not released because of their disclosive nature 
arising  from  high  sampling  fractions  and  skewed  distributions.  Other  types  of 
microdata are also not released in their original form, such as data from a population 
census.  These  datasets  are  typically  protected  through  tabulation  and  high  level 
aggregation which are   released in the form of tables. Alternatively, some statistical 
agencies  have  taken  the  approach  of  producing  synthetically  generated  multiple   2 
datasets of the microdata which retain some of the analytical properties of the original 
microdata (Rubin, 1993; Reiter, 2005a).  
 
In this paper, we focus on microdata from social surveys released as public-use files. 
In order to preserve the privacy and confidentiality of individuals responding to social 
surveys, statistical agencies must assess the disclosure risk   and if required choose 
appropriate  statistical  disclosure  limitation  (SDL)  methods  to  apply  to  the  data. 
Measuring disclosure risk involves assessing and evaluating numerically the risk of 
re-identifying statistical units. SDL methods perturb, modify, or summarize the data 
in order to prevent re-identification by a potential attacker. Higher levels of protection 
through SDL methods however impact negatively on the utility and quality of the 
data. The SDL decision problem therefore is based on finding the optimal balance 
between managing disclosure risk to tolerable thresholds depending on the mode for 
accessing the data and ensuring high utility in the data. 
 
Agencies  usually  distinguish  between  an  identifying  or  key  variable,  the  value  of 
which an adversary is assumed to know (perhaps from public sources) for a target unit, 
and a sensitive variable, the value of which an adversary wishes to learn for the target 
unit.  In any released microdata, directly identifying variables, such as name, address 
or identification numbers, are removed. Disclosure risk typically arises when small 
counts on cross-classified indirect identifying key variables (such as: age, sex, place 
of residence, marital status, occupation, etc.) can be used to identify an individual and 
confidential information on a sensitive variable may be learnt. Identifying variables 
are typically categorical since statistical agencies will often coarsen the data before its 
release. Therefore, even a variable such as age will often be grouped into categories. 
Sensitive variables can be continuous (e.g., income) or categorical (e.g., health status).  
 
SDL techniques for microdata include perturbative methods which alter the data and 
non-perturbative  methods  which  limit  the  amount  of  information  released  in  the 
microdata.  Examples  of  non-perturbative  SDL  techniques  are  global  recoding, 
suppression and sub-sampling (see Willenborg and De Waal, 2001). These methods 
are  the  most  common  for  protection  microdata  arising  from  social  surveys. 
Perturbative methods might be used, either for all records in the microdata or for only 
those deemed to be at high risk. Perturbative methods for continuous varaibles include 
adding  random  noise  (Fuller,  1993;  Yancey,  Winkler  and  Creecy,  2002),  micro-
aggregation (replacing values with their average within groups of records) (Defays 
and Nanopoulos, 1992), rounding to a pre-selected rounding base, and rank swapping 
(swapping values between pairs of records within small groups) (Dalenius and Reiss, 
1982; Fienberg and McIntyre, 2005). Perturbative methods for categorical variables  
include record swapping (typically swapping geography variables) and a more general 
post-randomization probability mechanism (PRAM) where categories of variables are 
changed or not changed according to a prescribed probability matrix and a stochastic 
selection  process  (Gouweleeuw,  Kooiman,  Willenborg,  and  De  Wolf,  1998).  For 
more  information  on  these  methods  see  also:  Willenborg  and  De  Waal  (2001), 
Gomatam  and  Karr  (2003),  Domingo-Ferrer,  Mateo-Sanz,  and  Torra  (2001)  and 
references therein. 
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In  this paper  we  describe  how  statistical  agencies would  define disclosure risk in 
Section  2.  We  contrast  their  approach  with  the  notion  of  differential  privacy  as 
defined  in  the  computer  science  literature  (Dinur  and  Nissim,  2003;  Dwork, 
McSherry,  Nissim  and  Smith,  2006)  in  Section  3.  We  then  examine  whether  the 
common practice of releasing microdata from social surveys and/or perturbing the 
microdata prior to release guarantees differential privacy in Sections 4 and 5. We 
conclude with a discussion in Section 6.  
 
2.  Defining Disclosure Risk 
 
In the statistical literature, two broad notions of disclosure risk are used: identification 
disclosure,  which  refers  to  the  possibility  that  an  adversary  can  link  a  microdata 
record to a known unit in the population, and attribute (or inferential) disclosure, 
which refers to the possibility that an adversary can learn new information about a 
target unit in the population (Duncan and Lambert, 1989; Skinner, 1992). The first 
notion  is particularly  relevant  to  survey  microdata,  since  it  is  often  referred  to  in 
relevant  legislation  or  professional  codes  of  practice.  The  fact  that  identification 
disclosure  does  not  refer  to  any  particular  survey  variable  also  has  practical 
advantages in social surveys where there may be a large number of survey variables. 
The notion of differential privacy is most closely related to the concept of attribute 
(inferential) disclosure, by referring to what new information an adversary could learn 
about a target unit.  We now discuss these different notions in more detail. 
 
2.1  Identification Risk 
 
We suppose that an adversary knows the values of a vector 
0 i x of key variables for a 
target unit  0 i and seeks to use these values to link the unit to a record in the microdata, 
which  we  write  as  an  n k ×  matrix s X ɶ ,  with  rows  corresponding  to  n  units  in  a 
samplesand columns corresponding to the values of the key variables, after SDL has 
been applied. In order that identification risk can be well-defined, we assume in this 
section that the records in the released microdata can meaningfully be associated with 
units in the population. For certain kinds of SDL methods, such as synthetic data or 
micro-aggregation, this may not be the case.  
  
Identification risk is defined in terms of the probability that such a link is correct 
(Bethlehem, Keller and Pannekoek, 1990; Reiter, 2005b; Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). 
If it were the case that (i) no sampling occurs; (ii) the combination of values of the 
key variables for the target unit is unique in the population and (iii) the key values, as 
recorded in the microdata, are known by the adversary for the target unit, then the 
adversary could deduce the correct link and the identification risk might be taken to 
be unity.  The presence of sampling and the use of perturbative methods, leading to 
departures  from  (i)  and  (iii)  respectively,  are  primary  ways  of  reducing  the 
identification risk.  
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In the presence of sampling, definitions of identification risk will usually depend on 
population  characteristics,  which  will,  in  general,  be  unknown  and  this  creates  a 
problem of statistical inference, i.e. estimating the risk measure from sample data,  
which may be hard in practice to solve. In particular, sample frames that are used to 
draw the samples for social surveys are typically area frames or address registers and 
will not include population-wide information on key variables.  
 
One approach to assessing the impact of a perturbative SDL method on identification 
risk is to start with a record linkage method and a set of key variables, which an 
adversary is assumed to use, and then to use these to match the protected microdata 
matched back to the original  dataset (Yancey, Winkler, and Creecy, 2002; Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra, 2003). It is less easy to assess the impact of sampling, however.  
 
Another approach is through probabilistic models, as first proposed by Bethlehem, 
Keller, and Pannekoek (1990).  Individual per-record risk measures are based on the 
probability  of  re-identification.  These  per-record  risk  measures  are  aggregated  to 
obtain global risk measures for the entire file. As mentioned in Section I, the key 
variables may be taken to be categorical, defining a contingency table. In this case, 
redefine the 1 k ×  vector x so that k  is the number of cells in the table and  i j = x e   if  
unit i is in cell  j , } ,..., 1 { k j∈ , where  j e  is the 1 k ×  vector with a 1 in the j
th position 
and zeros elsewhere. The vector of counts j f
~
 in the cells j in the microdata (after 
SDL) may then be expressed as  1 2 f ( , ,..., )
T
k n s f f f = =1 X ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  where n 1  is the  1 × n  vector 
of ones. In the same way, we define  1 2 f ( , ,..., )
T
k n s f f f = =1 X  where  s X is the n k ×  
matrix representing the original unperturbed microdata and  1 2 ( , ,..., )
T
k N U F F F = = F 1 X  is 
the vector of population counts, where  U X  is the  N k ×  matrix of population values of 
i x  and  N  is  the  population  size.  The  identification  risk  will  depend  on  these 
population counts  j F , ( 1,..., ) j k = which will generally be unknown. The probabilistic 
model  makes  the  natural  assumption  in  the  contingency  table  literature  that:  
~ ( ) j j F Poisson λ , where  j λ  is the expected population count. If the sample is drawn 
by Poisson or Bernoulli sampling with a sampling fraction  j π  in cell  jand the sample 
frequency in cell j is  j f  (which is a function of  s X ) then  | ~ ( (1 )) j j j j F f Poisson λ π −  
provides  a  predictive  distribution  for  inference  about  the  unknown    j F  assuming 
conditional independence.   Skinner   and Holmes (1998) and Elamir and Skinner 
(2006) propose using a log-linear model to estimate the parameters j λ . The sample 
frequencies    j f    are  independent  Poisson  distributed  with  mean j j j   π λ = .  A  log-
linear model for the j    is expressed as:  log( ) ' j j   β = z  where  j z  is a design vector 
which denotes the main effects and interactions of the model for the key variables. 
The maximum likelihood (MLE) estimator β ˆ  may be obtained by solving the score 
equations: [ exp( ' )] 0 j j j j
j
f π β − = ∑ z z .  Skinner and Shlomo (2008) discuss goodness 
of fit criteria to ensure unbiased estimation of j   .        5 
                                                                               
The  fitted  values  are  calculated  by:  ˆ ˆ exp( ' ) j j   β = z  and ˆ ˆ / j j j λ   π = .  These  are 
plugged into the expressions:          1 ˆ ˆ ( 1) ( 1| 1) j j j
j
I f P F f τ = = = = ∑   for the number of 
sample uniques that are population uniques   and  2 ˆ ˆ ( 1) (1/ | 1) j j j
j
I f E F f τ = = = ∑   the 
number  of  correct  matches  from  among  the  sample  uniques.  Under  the  Poisson 
model:                          ( 1| 1) exp( (1 )) j j j j P F f λ π = = = − −  and             
(1/ | 1) [1 exp( (1 ))]/[ (1 )] j j j j j j E F f λ π λ π = = − − − .        Shlomo  and  Skinner  (2010) 
extended this model to take into account misclassification either arising from errors in 
the data collection and processing or introduced purposely into the data as an SDL 
technique,  for example PRAM to misclassify categories of categorical variables.  
 
2.2 Attribute Disclosure 
 
Let x denote again the vector of key variables, the value of which an adversary is 
assumed to know for a target unit, and let  y  denote a sensitive variable, the value of 
which  an  adversary  wishes  to  learn  for  the  target  unit.    A  measure  of  attribute 
disclosure may then be defined in terms of the predictive probability distribution of  y  
given x and the observable data from the microdata. 
 
2.3  Differential Privacy 
 
In  the  computer  science  literature  on  differential  privacy,  there  is  usually  no 
distinction between key variables and sensitive variables. The starting point is the 
(original) database of attribute values from which the microdata are generated via the 
SDL  method.  It  is  supposed  that  an  adversary  wishes  to  learn  about  the  attribute 
values for a specific (target) unit in the database. A ‘worst case’ scenario is allowed 
for, in which the adversary has complete information about all other units represented 
in the database (Dwork, et al., 2006). Under this assumption, we now let x denote the 
full vector of attribute values, not distinguishing between key and sensitive variables.   
 
In our survey setting, there are two possible definitions of the database: the  k N ×  
population ‘database’  U X    and the  k n×  sample 'database'  s X , which is a sub-matrix 
of  U X .  The sample database might be viewed from one perspective as more realistic, 
since it contains the data collected by the statistical agency, whereas the population 
database would include values of survey variables for non-sampled units, which are 
unknown to the agency.  A problem with the sample database for differential privacy 
is that it would assume that the adversary knows which units fall in the sample, an 
assumption referred to as ‘response knowledge’  by Bethlehem et al. (1990). It is 
well-known  in  the  statistical  literature  that  making  this  assumption  can  increase 
disclosure risk hugely and that the agency must take considerable care to avoid this 
situation,  wherever  possible.  There  may  be  practical  circumstances,  when  this  is   6 
infeasible, but we suppose here that it is reasonable to suppose that the adversary does 
not have response knowledge. We therefore use the population database  U X  to define 
differential privacy. We treat the sampling as part of the SDL mechanism and suppose 
that prior adversary knowledge relates to aspects of  U X .  
 
Suppose that the SDL methods leads to an arbitrary ordering of the records in the 
microdata  so  that  we  can  view  the  released  data  as  the  vector  of  counts: 
1 2 ( , ,..., ) k f f f = f ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ,  as  defined  in  the  previous  section.  Let  Pr( | ) U f X ɶ  denote  the 
probability of  f
~
with respect to an SDL mechanism, which includes sampling and/or 
misclassification, and where  U X  is treated as fixed.  
 
 
Definition (Dwork et al.,2006): ε - differential privacy holds if: 
   
(1)
(2)
Pr[ | ]
max ln
Pr[ | ]
U
U
ε
 
≤  
 
f X
f X
ɶ
ɶ             (1) 
for some  0 > ε , where the maximum is over all pairs 
(1) (2) ( , ) U U X X , which differ in  
only one row and across all possible values of f
~
. 
 
Based on this definition, the next two sections consider the question of whether ε - 
differential  privacy  holds  for  microdata  containing  samples  from  social  surveys. 
Section 3 addresses this question for microdata which have not undergone any   SDL 
techniques. Section 4 considers whether differential privacy holds for microdata from 
social surveys which have undergone SDL techniques and under what conditions we 
have differential privacy.  
 
3.  Sampling and Differential Privacy 
 
In this section, we suppose that SDL  arises solely from sampling and that there is no 
perturbation,  so  that  s s = X X ɶ  and  = f f ɶ .et  the  sample  s  be  drawn  by  a  specified 
probability  sampling  scheme  with  probability  ( ) p s  from  the  population  U .  For 
example, under simple random sampling, all possible subsets of specified size n have 
an equal probability of selection from a population of size N, i.e.   


 


=
n
N
s p / 1 ) ( .  
The  expression  Pr( | ) Pr( | ) U U = f X f X ɶ  in  (1)  may  be  expressed  as 
( )
Pr( | ) U
s S
p(s)
∈
= ∑
f
f X ,  where  ) (f S  denotes  the  set  of  samples  s  with  0 ) ( > s p  for 
which 
T
n s = 1 X f . For example, under simple random sampling of size n we have    7 
1
Pr( | )
k
j
U
j j
F N
f n =
   
=          
∏ f X  .             (2) 
 
Based on the definition in (1), ε -differential privacy will not hold for some ε  iff 
there is a pair
(1) (2) ( , ) U U X X  which differ in only one row and for which 
(1) Pr[ | ] 0 U ≠ f X  
and 
(2) Pr[f | ] 0 U = X . Consider an arbitrary value of f . Under many sampling schemes 
used  for  drawing  samples  in  social  surveys,  such  as  simple  random  sampling  or 
stratified sampling designs, there will exist 
(1)
U X  such that 
) 1 (
j j F f =  for some j and  
(1) Pr[ | ] 0 U ≠ f X ,  for  example,  a  sample  unique  in  a  cell j  that  is  also  a  population 
unique.  Now if we change the row of 
(1)
U X  which takes the value  j e  and construct a 
(2)
U X  for  which  j j j f F F < − = 1
) 1 ( ) 2 (    we  obtain 
(2) Pr[ | ] 0 U = f X .  It  is  clear  that  if  
(1)
j j F f =  then ε -  differential  privacy  will  not  hold.  This  result  follows  for  other 
sample  designs  based  on  simple  random  sampling,  for  example  stratified  random 
sampling or random sampling of clustered data.  
 
There are at least two reasons why a statistical agency might not consider such a 
breach of ε - differential  privacy to be of  concern.   First, the potential  disclosure 
depends upon an intruder knowing the count 
0 ( ) i
j F
−  for the cell  j  across the whole of 
the  population  excluding  the  target  individual  0 i .  Given  this  knowledge  and  the 
observation  that  this  count  equals 1 j f − ,  the  intruder  could  infer  that  the  target 
individual falls in this cell (and appears in the microdata).  For the kinds of large 
populations of individuals upon which social surveys in most countries are typically 
based,  it  may  be  deemed  unrealistic,  however,  for  an  intruder  to  have  precise 
information on all individuals in the population except one.   The nearest realistic 
possibilities  are  that  there  exist  an  external  database  which  either  (a)  via  full 
population information, enables the population count  j F  to be determined together 
with the identities of these  j F  individuals or (b) provides identities of an unknown 
subset of population individuals in the cell. In neither of these cases would exact 
disclosure occur. In (a), the key variable value for the target individual would already 
be known to the intruder. In (b), there would be residual uncertainty. 
 
Secondly, the event that the count in the population  j F   is exactly equal to the count 
in the sample   j f  might be deemed sufficiently negligible to disregard for survey 
microdata. By assumption, units in social surveys have small inclusion probabilities 
and the probability that all population units in a cell  j  will appear in the sample, 
i.e. j j f F m = = , will be very small for  2 m =  (doubles) and even smaller for  2 m > . 
The most realistic outcome is that a sample unique is population unique, i.e. the case 
1 j j f F = =  but, as we illustrate in the following example, this will typically also be 
unlikely.  
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Numerical Example: Consider simple random sampling and two samples: Sample 1 
with  n=5,000 and Sample 2 with n=10,000,  from a population of size N=1,000,000, 
so that   inclusion probabilities are  005 . 0 = π  and  01 . 0 = π , respectively.  This is a 
realistic sample design at statistical agencies. Let 16 dichotomous key variables be 
generated  independently,  each  as  a  0-1  Bernoulli  random  variables  with  the 
probability of 0.2. This defines a key with 65,536 cells or an average cell size in the 
population of 15.3. We draw 1000 samples for each of the sample sizes and examine 
the proportion of  cells  where  j j f F =   relative to  j f .  The average proportion of 
sample uniques that are population uniques was 0.024 for Sample 1 and 0.035 for 
Sample 2. The proportions for doubles or triples in the population were minuscule.   
 
To  reflect  such  uncertainty  the  definition  of  ε -  differential  privacy  might  be 
modified.  Machanavajjhala,  Kifer,  Abowd,  Gehrke  and  Vilhuber  (2008)  define 
) , ( δ ε probabilistic differential privacy which allows the constraint in (1) to hold with 
probability at least  δ − 1 . In other words, ε -differential privacy can fail with a small 
probability,  not  more  than δ .  This  small  probability  is  known  as  the  leakage. 
Although sampling is not sufficient to achieve ε - differential privacy, it may achieve 
) , ( δ ε probabilistic  differential  privacy,  with  little  leakage,  as  in  the  numerical 
example above.  
                         
As in (2), theoretical expressions for the probabilities relating to leakage will depend 
on the population cell counts  j F  for the cross-classified key variables and these are 
generally unknown to statistical agencies since they depend on non-sampled units. In 
this  case,  the  agency  may  estimate  the  proportions  according  to  the  probabilistic 
model described in Section 2.1. For example, the probability that a sample unique is a 
population unique is  ( 1| 1) exp[ (1 )] j j j j P F f λ π = = = − −  and the expected population 
count  j λ  may be estimated through log-linear modeling (Skinner and Shlomo, 2008).   
Figure 1 represents the probability of a population unique for different values of j λ . 
As can be seen, when the expected population count is less than one,  the probability 
of a population unique may be high, but for larger values of this count, as in the 
numerical example above where the average cell count is 15, the probability very 
quickly drops toward zero. 
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Figure 1:  Probability that a sample unique is a population unique,  ), SU | PU Pr(  according to  
the probabilistic model in Section 2.1 for different values of the expected population count  j λ in 
a cell j (with  0.005) j π =  
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4. Perturbation and Differential Privacy  
 
Assuming  now  that  there  is  no  sampling  (so  that s U = ),  we  consider 
misclassification-based SDL techniques which generates the   k n×  matrix  s X ɶ  from 
s X .  We define the misclassification matrix as:  
 
1 2 1 2 Pr( | ) i j i j j j M = = = x e x e ɶ   ,      1 2 1,..., , , 1,..., i n j j k = =                              (3) 
where    i x ɶ  denotes  the 
th i row  of  s X ɶ .    Assuming  independent  misclassification  for 
different units, we can write the conditional distribution Pr( | ) s s X X ɶ  in terms of the 
matrix M.  
 
Suppose first that  s X ɶ  can be treated as the released data. Then, using also the fact that  
s U = X X ,  we  may  replace  Pr[ | ] U f X ɶ  in  by  Pr[ | ] s s X X ɶ  in  the  definition  of    ε -
differential privacy.  If  we assume independent misclassification for different units 
then we can write  
   
(1) (1) Pr[ | ] Pr( | ) s s i i
i s ∈
=∏ X X x x ɶ ɶ .           (4) 
Suppose that 
(1)
s X  differs from 
(2)
s X  only in row i, so that  
(1) (2)
i i ≠ x x , then  
   
(1)
(2)
(1) (1)
(2) (2)
Pr[ | ] Pr( | )
Pr[ | ] Pr( | )
jj s s i i
s s i jj
M
M
= =
i
X X x x
X X x x
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
, 
where 
(1) , j j ɶ  and 
(2) j  are the entries of   i x ɶ , 
(1)
i x  or 
(2)
i x  respectively which take the 
value 1.    10 
 
It follows that there exists a finite ε  for which ε -differential privacy holds iff all 
elements of M are positive (i.e. none are zero). 
Note that  
( )
(1)
(2)
(1)
(1) (2) (2)
max Pr[ | ]
max ln ln max max ln( ) min ln( )
, Pr[ | ]
jj s s
j j j jj jj
s s jj
M X X
M M
j j j X X M
   
  = = −     ≠    
ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ ɶ
                   ( ) max ln[max ] ln[min ] j j j jj jj M M = − ɶ ɶ ɶ  
We assumed earlier that the rows of  s X ɶ  will be subject to an arbitrary ordering so that 
it is more appropriate to write  f ɶ  as the released data.  Let a  be the k k ×  matrix with 
entries  ( , ) i i j jj j
i s
a I x e x e
∈
= = = ∑ ɶ ɶ ɶ  and note that 
T
k = a1 f ɶ  and 
T
k = 1 a f . Then assuming 
again independent misclassification as in (3) we may write  
      Pr[ | ]
jj a
s jj
j j
M
∈
= ∑∏∏
a A
f X
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ  
where A is the set of possible values of  a  for which 
T
k = a1 f ɶ  and 
T
k = 1 a f . Note that, 
under these assumptions,  Pr[ | ] s f X ɶ  depends on  s X  only via f  so that we may write 
Pr[ | ] Pr[ | ] s = f X f f ɶ ɶ . 
 
If  s U = X X  is changed in just one row then  j f  will be increased by 1 for one value of 
j  and decreased by 1 for another value of  j . If the values of f  before and after the 
change are denoted 
(1) f  and 
(2) f  respectively we can write 
(1) (2) | | 2 − = f f . Note that 
Abowd and Vilhuber (2008)  define  ε -differential privacy, with Pr[ | ] f f ɶ  replacing 
Pr[ | ] U f X ɶ  , so that ε -differential privacy holds if (1) holds for all pairs (
(1) f ,
(2) f )  
where 
(1) (2) | | 2 − = f f . 
If all elements of M are positive then Pr[ | ] 0 > f f ɶ  iff 
T T
k k n = = f 1 f 1 ɶ ɶ  
If  all elements of M are not positive, say   0 jj M = ɶ  ( j j ≠ ɶ ).  Then  j f ɶ ɶ  is bounded 
above by  j n f − .  Let f ɶ  be defined by 
(1)
j n f −   in cell  j ɶ,  
(1)
j f  in cell  j  and 0 in the 
remaining cells and, assuming independent misclassification and  0 jj M > , we have 
(1) Pr[ | ] 0 > f f ɶ . Suppose 
(2) (1) 1 j j f f = + .  Then we must have 
(2) Pr[ | ] 0 = f f ɶ  since  j f ɶ ɶ  is 
bounded above by 
(1) 1 j n f − − . Hence ε -differential privacy does not hold.  
 
Hence, as before, ε -differential privacy holds iff all elements of M are positive if we 
treat the released data as f ɶ  rather than  s X ɶ . 
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We next examine misclassification matrices M for some common SDL techniques on 
categorical variables and assess whether all elements are positive.  
 
Recoding: For the non-perturbative method of recoding, which is the most common 
SDL technique for microdata arising from social surveys, assume a variable where 
categories  1 to a are changed to category 1.The misclassification matrix is:  
 
 
It  is  clear  that  with  elements  equal  to  zero,  ε -differential  privacy  will  not  be 
guaranteed.  
 
Random Data Swapping:  For the perturbative method of random data swapping, the  
probability of selecting any 2 records for swapping data is 
1
2
n
−
 
 
 
. Let    j n and   k n  be 
the number of records taking values j and k and assume counts  j n  and  k n are positive, 
then:  
 
 
 
and, provided there are no zero counts of categories, there are no zero elements in the 
misclassification matrix.  
 
PRAM: The SDL technique of PRAM uses a misclassification (probability) matrix 
M to make random changes across categories of a variable.   We can also require the 
property of invariance of the misclassification matrix:  = vM v  where v  is the vector 
of  sample  proportions: 
1 ,...,
k n n
n n
  =  
 
v .  This  ensures  that  the  perturbed  marginal 
distribution will be similar to the original marginal distribution in the microdata.  The 
misclassification  matrix  should  be  defined  to  have  no  zero  elements  in  order  to  
ensure differential privacy.  Note that in practice, there may be zero elements in the 
misclassification matrix which represent  structural zeros in the data, i.e. impossible 
combinations of categories such as children having an occupation as a 'doctor'.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
We  have  contrasted  alternative  approaches  to  assessing  disclosure  risk  with  the 
release  of  survey  microdata.  Sampling  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  guarantee    ε  -
differential  privacy.  There  are,  however,  at  least  two  reasons  why ε  -differential 
privacy  might  be  deemed  too  strong  a  condition  by  statistical  agencies.  First,  the 
disclosure scenario associated with this definition, that an adversary knows the entire 
population  database  except  for  the  target  individual,  may  be  deemed  unrealistic. 


 > + − = = =
=
otherwise
j and a k j or j and a k
M jk 0
1 1 , 1 ,..., 1 1
2
, .
2 2
j
j k
jk kj jj
n
n n
M M M
n n
 
 
  = = =
   
   
     12 
Second, the event that breach of the condition occurs may be very unlikely and a 
broader definition, such as  ) , ( δ ε probabilistic differential privacy of Machanavajjhala 
et  al.  (2008),  may  better  match  the  disclosure  control  principles  informing  the 
agency’s release practice. 
 
The  disclosure  scenario  more  usually  considered  by  statistical  agencies  when 
considering the release of microdata assumes that an adversary can use key variables 
to match the data to publicly available external datasets and identify individuals. This 
leads to the measures of identification risk. The agency will generally not know the 
entire population database and has to rely on probabilistic models to assess the risk of 
identification.   
 
Perturbation  via  misclassification  of  the  identifying  categorical  key  variables  does 
guarantee ε  -differential privacy, provided the misclassification matrix do not contain 
zero elements. It will also generally reduce the risk of identification (Shlomo and 
Skinner, 2010). The combination of  sampling and perturbation will generally lead to 
greater  protection  than  either  method  used  singly.    In  particular,  the  targeting  of 
perturbation at key variable value combinations which are unique in the sample or 
have  low  sample  counts  may  be  expected  to  reduce  the  leakage  under  ) , ( δ ε  
probabilistic  differential  privacy.  Dwork,  et  al.   (2006)  define  low  ‘sensitivity’  in 
circumstances like the typical survey set-up described in this paper and conclude that  
'only  a  small  perturbation  to  the  proportions  should  be  necessary  to  achieve ε  -
differential privacy'.   
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